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Abstract:
Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2005 and 2015, we find that domestic
mutual funds have positive effect on CEO pay-performance relationship, and this effect
becomes stronger when their ownership is higher and closer to the controlling shareholder’s
ownership. This effect is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), firms facing
weaker industry tournament incentives, and firms located in more developed regions. However,
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) do not have such an influence. Overall, our
study contends that the effectiveness of institutional investors’ monitoring role is subject to
their identity, controlling shareholders and institutional environments.

Keywords: Institutional investors; CEO pay; Firm performance; China
JEL: D21, G32, M21

The authors would like to express their thanks for comments from the editors and two anonymous referees,
Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti, Haiyan Jiang, Terry Walter and other participants at the 2017 Financial Market and
Corporate Governance (FMCG) conference and the seminar held at University of Wollongong. All remaining
errors are our own. Please address correspondence to Xiaofei Pan via email: xpan@uow.edu.au
1

1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, the growth of institutional investors has become a global
phenomenon and they play an important role in mitigating information asymmetry and
monitoring managers. 1 This role became even more prominent after the 2008 global financial
crisis when institutional investors were required to exert influence on management proposals
including those related to CEO compensation (OECD, 2009).
Since then, a number of studies have revealed explicit evidence for the roles played by
institutional investors in developed markets. They show that institutional investors are effective
monitors and can mitigate information asymmetry. 2 Meanwhile, other studies have examined
the roles of institutional investors in emerging markets and document that institutional investors
can affect firm performance/valuation (Yuan et al., 2008; Lin and Fu, 2017), the quality of
financial reporting (Chan et al., 2014), firm innovation (Rong et al., 2017) and dividend policy
(Firth et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, it is still unclear
whether institutional investors could discipline managers’ behaviors and influence the overall
corporate governance in the interests of all the other minority shareholders. It is expected that
this issue might be more prominent and relevant in emerging markets. On the one hand, the
institutional environment is still underdeveloped and investor protection legislation is weaker
in emerging markets. Thus, whether the expected functions of institutional investors can be
ensured is unclear, as these concerns directly shape the incentives and behaviors of institutional
investors. On the other hand, ownership concentration is usually a prevalent aspect in emerging
markets, and controlling shareholders usually make the final decisions regarding firm policies.
Institutional investors may have been captured by controlling shareholders and thus their
independence is compromised, so their monitoring role is no longer as straightforward.
In this study, we empirically examine whether and how institutional investors monitor CEO
compensation in China, the largest emerging market. Our study is motivated by several strands
of literature. First, a series of studies suggest that institutional investors can potentially affect
corporate compensation schemes (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Croci et al., 2012; Cheng et al.,
2015; Golebiowska and Urbanek, 2016), and these impacts are different due to differing
investment horizons, the cost of monitoring, and the business relationships with their portfolio
firms (Chowdhury and Wang, 2009; Shin and Seo, 2011; Zhu et al., 2017). Since these studies
mainly focus on developed markets, it is really unknown whether it is the case in China with

See, for example, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Aggarwal et al. (2005), Shin and Seo (2011), Helwege et al. (2012),
Boone and White (2015), Bena et al. (2017) and Chen and Keung (2018).
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See, for example, Koh (2007), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Boehmer and Kelley (2009), Fich et al. (2015), Cornett
et al. (2007) and Borochin and Yang (2017).
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poor investor protection and prevailing ownership concentration.
Second, it has been argued that the role of shareholders is mainly attributed to their
identities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2008; Lin et al., 2011), so a
more rigorous investigation of institutional investor heterogeneity is required. In China’s stock
markets, there are various kinds of institutional investors with different ownership identities,
such as private institutions, governments, and foreign institutions. This setting can thus provide
a sufficient tension where the different monitoring roles exerted by various types of institutional
investors can be investigated.
Third, existing studies document that if firms have several shareholders with substantial
ownership, they have the incentive to monitor the controlling shareholders to reduce the
associated expropriation and moral hazard activities (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Laeven
and Levine, 2008; Jiang et al., 2018). However, it is unclear whether the effectiveness of
monitoring by other large shareholders can be attributed to the identities of controlling
shareholders. Chinese listed firms can be divided into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nonSOEs, and these controlling shareholders have different incentives for monitoring CEO
compensation (Kato and Long, 2006; Cao et al., 2011). In the spirit of these studies, we further
investigate how institutional investors respond to controlling shareholder’s ownership.
It has been argued that CEO compensation incentives are not only determined by observed
CEO characteristics, but also determined by unobserved characteristics such as CEO
psychological traits and personality. Coles and Li (2016, 2018) further document that these
unobserved CEO characteristics can better explain the variations of CEO pay-performance
sensitivity. Therefore, in our empirical analysis, we employ firm-fixed effects model as
estimation method to address this concern. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005
to 2015, we obtain the following findings. First, the presence of domestic mutual funds can
strengthen the relationship between CEO pay and firm accounting performance (measured by
ROA), and such positive effects are stronger when their ownership becomes closer to that of
the controlling shareholders. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) wield
no significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. Second, empirical results show
that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are more pronounced in non-SOEs than in
SOEs, particularly the central government controlled SOEs. Third, additional analysis reveals
that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are stronger in firms located in more
developed regions or in firms with weaker industry tournament, which supports the assertion
that mutual funds strengthen the CEO pay-performance relationship by improving corporate
governance. Furthermore, when we use annual stock returns and Tobin’s Q to measure firm
performance, the effects of institutional investors on the relationship between CEO pay and
3

firm performance become insignificant. These results indicate that institutional investors have
weaker incentives to link CEO pay to market performance. These results are robust when taking
the potential endogeneity into consideration and using alternative measures of executive
compensation.
Our study makes several contributions to existing literature. First, over the last decade
many studies have examined shareholder activism by institutional investors in developed
markets (Smith 1996; Cvijanović et al., 2016; Gillan and Starks, 2000). There are also a large
number of studies investigating the influence of institutional investors in emerging markets
(e.g., Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2016; Lin and Fu, 2017; Rong et al., 2017). But these studies
on emerging markets only examine the effects of institutional investors’ activism on firm
performance or firm policies (eg., dividend policy) that could benefit institutional investors
directly (Firth et al., 2016). As a complement to these studies, our study examines how
institutional investors affect corporate governance, in particular the CEO pay-performance
relationship in China. Moreover, studies from developed countries or international markets
document that foreign institutional investors have a positive effect on enhancing corporate
governance (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Luong et al., 2017), whereas our study finds some
contrasting evidence that QFIIs exert no significant effect on corporate governance in China
due to its different and unique culture (a relationship-based economy), different dialects and
government intervention in the economy. This study therefore advances our understanding of
the real effects that domestic and foreign institutional investors have on corporate governance.
Second, our work builds on literature that examines shareholders’ influence on corporate
governance (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009). By focusing on the institutional
investors who are usually non-controlling shareholders, we provide direct evidence that their
influence on the CEO pay-performance relationship depends largely on their relative ownership
to controlling shareholders, which is consistent with arguments made by Firth et al. (2010) and
Huang and Zhu (2015). We find that the monitoring effects of institutional investors depend on
their ownership, as well as the difference in ownership compared to controlling shareholders.
Third, our study also adds to literature that examines the effect of identity of shareholders
on the CEO pay-performance relationship (Kato and Long, 2006; Conyon and He, 2011). From
the perspective of ownership types, we examine the effects of institutional investors by
distinguishing different types of owners because this is relevant to their behaviors and provides
evidence of how comprehensive institutional investors work in emerging markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background
information of institutional investors in China and develops hypotheses. Section 3 introduces
the data and method of analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical results and finally, section 5
4

draws some conclusions.
2. Background and hypotheses development
2.1 Development of institutional investors in China
It is about two decades since institutional investors emerged in China and they have now
become important market participants. In 1997, the government issued the ‘Interim measures
for the administration of securities investment funds’ (amended in 2012), which formally allows
institutional investors to trade common shares on China’s stock exchanges. Since then the
domestic mutual funds have grown quickly. For example, there were only 10 fund management
companies managing 23 mutual funds in 1999, but in 2015 there are 97 fund management
companies managing 2,676 mutual funds. The size of mutual funds grew steadily from 51.42
billion RMB at the end of 1999 to 4,470.68 billion RMB by the end of 2015. 3 Domestic mutual
funds are now playing a “pillar role” of institutional investors in China.
To further promote the development of the stock markets, the People’s Bank of China (the
central bank in China) and China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) jointly issued
(in 2002) the ‘Measures for the administration of domestic securities investment of Qualified
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs)’ (amended in 2006), which formally introduced
qualified foreign institutional investors to the Chinese stock exchanges. The number of QFIIs
has increased substantially such that there were 12 QFIIs by the end of 2003, and 291 by the
end of October 2015.
In addition to domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, there are other types of institutional
investors simultaneously and actively investing in the Chinese stock market such as banks,
insurance companies, social security funds, brokers, entrust companies, and financial
companies. These institutional investors are usually passive investors who hold their ownership
due to business connections with firms. For instance, in line with the Commercial Bank law,
since 2003, banks can only hold shares which are pledged by firms as collateral for bank loans.
Thus, these institutional investors wield less exit threats because they mainly benefit from
business with firms rather than an increase in the value of the equity they hold.
2.2 Institutional investors and CEO pay-performance in China
In the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the incentive and behaviors of institutional
investors depend largely on their identities. It is thus of great significance to distinguish the
types of institutional investors for investigating their effects in the investee firms (Borochin and
Yang, 2017). According to what we described in the above section, we mainly identify both
At the end of 1999, the exchange rate between USD and CNY is CNY8.279/USD. At the end of 2015, the
exchange rate between USD and CNY is CNY6.494/USD.
3
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domestic mutual funds and QFIIs.
It has been well documented that institutional investors serve the monitoring role in
mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders, thus improving the CEO
pay-performance sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2003). Domestic mutual
funds in China are controlled by domestic private institutions whose main objective is to
maximize portfolio returns. Moreover, domestic mutual funds are becoming large, betterinformed and more active shareholders. Therefore, domestic mutual funds are similar to their
counterparts in developed markets and are able to exert influence on firms’ decisions. We expect
that domestic mutual funds have positive effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship for
the following several reasons.
First, domestic mutual funds do not have business connections with their portfolio firms,
so their monitoring activities are less sensitive to pressure and face less conflict of interest with
their portfolio firms (Yuan et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2014). Thus, domestic mutual funds have
strong incentives to restrain managerial opportunistic behaviors and impose a strong
dependence of CEO pay on firm performance (Cornett et al., 2007). Moreover, since domestic
mutual funds hold a relatively large percentage of shares, they can also place more exit threat
on investee firms by voting with their feet. For this reason the board prefers to make decisions
that favor mutual funds.
Second, the compensation of mutual funds’ managers is not only related to their funds’ size
but also linked to the incremental value of their funds’ assets (shares), which directly reflect the
performance of the investee firms. So mutual funds’ managers are concerned about the
performance of their investee firms and are likely to impose disciplinary activities over CEOs.
Third, professional skills in analyzing information enable investors to influence firms
(Borochin and Yang, 2017; Jiang and Yuan, 2018). Domestic mutual funds are considered to
have expertise and are professional in gathering and processing information. Their professional
information processing helps mitigate information asymmetry between managers and
shareholders, which makes it easier for shareholders to monitor managers’ behavior (Hartzell
and Starks, 2003). There is a suspicion that transient investors have short investment horizons
and consequently are unlikely to collect and analyze firm information. However, we argue that
transient investors could benefit from private information, as collecting/analyzing private
information enables them to trade ahead of firm-specific news and gain from short-term price
movements or avoid sudden loss (Boone and White, 2015).
Fourth, domestic mutual funds have reputational concerns because they are usually
expected to be monitors in firms. It is generally agreed that a weaker association between CEO
pay and firm performance signals a weak corporate governance and poor monitoring system
6

towards the stock markets. Therefore, a weaker relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance may lead to the reputational detriment of domestic mutual funds. To protect their
reputation, domestic mutual funds tend to strengthen the CEO pay and performance
relationship, so we form the following hypothesis:
H1a: Domestic mutual funds have positive effects on the CEO pay-performance
relationship.
With respect to QFIIs which are owned by foreigners, it has been extensively documented
that they are also effective monitors of firm management by providing more sophisticated
knowledge and advanced management skills (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Huang and Zhu, 2015;
Firth et al., 2016; Bena et al., 2017). However, because QFIIs are less familiar with the unique
institutional environment of China, such as relationship-based economy, many regional dialects
spoken and different accounting standards (Liu et al., 2014; Zou et al., 2016; Luong et al., 2017),
they do not have the ability to handle issues with their invested firms in comparison with their
domestic counterparty – domestic mutual funds. We propose that the expected significant and
beneficial effects of QFIIs on enhancing the positive relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance could be seriously compromised for the reasons set out below.
First, unlike developed countries, information asymmetry is severe in China’s market due
to both insider control and weak requirement for disclosure (Yuan et al., 2009). In the spirit of
Bae et al. (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2017), foreign investors may be less informed about
China’s firms than domestic investors. Coupled with the fact that the Chinese language is not
spoken worldwide (Liu et al., 2014), QFIIs are less efficient at processing and comprehending
information and thus face more severe information asymmetry when investing in China.
Second, the Chinese economy is highly controlled by the central and local governments
and imbedded within a culture traditionally based on relationships, which means that the key
element to success in business is to build and maintain a relationship with government (Shen et
al., 2019; Li et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014). Unlike domestic investors, it is
harder for foreign investors to cooperate with China’s regulators or establish valid connections
with government representatives, and this may undermine their expected efficient monitoring.
If these two reasons are combined, we conjecture that QFIIs may have a weaker effect on
enhancing the CEO pay-performance relationship:
H1b: QFIIs may have weaker effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship.
Moreover, an evolving literature on multiple large shareholders (MLS) asserts that other
large shareholders can serve efficient monitoring in curbing the expropriation by controlling
shareholders, achieved through forming coalitions with other large stakeholders or competing
for control by attracting minority shareholders. This becomes stronger when the ownership held
7

by these large shareholders is closer to the ownership held by the controlling shareholders
(Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig
et al., 2008, 2009; Mishra, 2011; Ben-Nasr et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2018). In China, ownership
of a business is usually concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, and domestic
mutual funds are usually other large shareholders. Thus, the monitoring influence of domestic
mutual funds is also subject to the balance of power between their ownership and that of
controlling shareholders. Following the MLS literature, we conjecture that when domestic
mutual funds present as one of the large shareholders and hold closer ownership to that of the
controlling shareholders, they are more likely to better monitor the CEO pay-performance
relationship. Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis:
H2: The positive effect of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance relationship
is stronger when the difference in ownership between domestic mutual funds and the controlling
shareholders decreases.
2.3 The effect of institutional investors in SOEs and non-SOEs
According to the above discussion, the effect of institutional investors is more likely to be
captured by controlling shareholders, so we also conjecture that the effects that institutional
investors have on the CEO pay-performance relationship are subject to the types of controlling
shareholders. Chinese listed firms can be divided into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nonSOEs (Peng et al., 2017). SOEs are controlled by different levels of government (Kong et al.,
2019). Multi-task theory contends that SOEs function more like the institutions of governments
and seek to achieve multiple objectives such as improving production, maintaining social
stability and keeping employment (Chang and Wong, 2009; Fan et al., 2013). Therefore, CEO
pay in SOEs does not dependent solely on firm performance, which weakens the relationship
between CEO pay and firm performance. Moreover, CEOs in Chinese SOEs have other
incentives to consider such as political promotion which also weakens the relationship between
CEO pay and firm performance. However, non-SOEs are controlled by private sector entities
who strive to maximize firm value and face less government intervention when making
decisions (Chen et al., 2011). This requires a stronger relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance in non-SOEs, which provides sufficient incentive for CEOs to perform well.
In addition, since 1978, Chinese SOEs have experienced a series of privatization and
corporatization reforms when the government awarded sufficient autonomy to enterprises and
relinquished its control over some SOEs to a large extent. Consequently, SOEs are becoming
market-oriented and aim to maximize profitability, and compensation of executives in SOEs is
becoming more aligned to profits and sales. However, this is more likely to be the case in those
8

SOEs controlled by the local governments (Chen et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2011), rather than in
those SOEs controlled by the central government. In particular, central SOEs are still under the
absolute control of the government which has certain political and strategic objectives, such as
maintaining its monopoly over some sensitive industries. So their CEO compensation
incentives are determined by the government, and less likely to be influenced by the
institutional investors. In this sense, we expect that institutional investors can affect the CEO
pay-performance relationship in local SOEs, but have no effect on the CEO pay-performance
relationship in central SOEs. Therefore, we form the following hypothesis:
H3: The influence of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance relationship is
stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, particularly central government controlled SOEs.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data and sample selection
The sample of empirical analysis includes firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2005 to 2015. Our sample year starts
from 2005 when individual executive compensation began to be disclosed in annual reports,
but only the total compensation received by the top three executives was reported before 2005.
From the total population of firms, we exclude those flagged with ST and *ST (Special
Treatment), firms from the finance industry and firms with missing information. The final
sample consists of 1,960 firms and 15,613 firm-year observations. All the data are collected
from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
3.2 Institutional investors and ownership measurements
Empirically, we apply three dimensions to measure institutional investors’ ownership. First,
we consider whether a firm has institutional investors as common shareholders and then create
two dummy variables, Mutuald and QFIId, which are equal to 1 if a firm has domestic mutual
funds and QFIIs as the common shareholders, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Second, we
consider the level of ownership held by institutional investors and then create two continuous
variables, Mutual and QFII, which are defined as the percentage of ownership held by domestic
mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Third, we consider the difference in ownership between
institutional investors and controlling shareholders and then create two continuous variables,
Mutualratio and QFIIratio, which are defined as the ratio of ownership held by domestic mutual
funds and QFIIs to the ownership held by the controlling shareholders, respectively. The higher
these two ratios are, the smaller the difference in ownership between institutional investors and
controlling shareholders is.

9

3.3 Model
In our empirical analysis, we use the following regression equation to examine the effects
of institutional investors on the CEO pay and firm performance relationship, which is reflected
by the coefficients of interactive terms:
CEOpayit =
β 0 + β1Mutuali ,t + β 2QFII i ,t + β3 ROAi ,t -1 +β 4 Mutuali ,t ∗ ROAi ,t -1
+ β5QFII i ,t * ROAi ,t −1 + β 6Othersi ,t + β 7 Sizei ,t + β8 Levi ,t + β9 Boardi ,t + β10 Indepi ,t
+ β11 Largest + β12CEOage + Dummy ( year ) + ε it

(1)

where CEOpay represents the compensation of CEOs as measured by the natural log of CEO’s
total cash compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus and other cash compensation. Mutual
and QFII represent domestic and foreign institutional ownerships, respectively, which are
discussed in section 3.2. ROA is return on assets calculated as the ratio of net income to total
assets, which serves to measure firm performance. To reflect the logical influence of
performance on CEO pay, we use one-year lagged performance as an independent variable in
the regression analysis so that the sample size for the regression analysis should be reduced. β4
and β5 are used to test our main hypotheses. According to our discussions, β4 is expected to be
significantly positive and β5 is expected to be insignificant.
To consider the effects of other variables on CEO pay, we also include a set of control
variables, namely firm size, leverage level and board characteristics. The definitions of all the
variables in this study are listed in Appendix A. Year dummy is also included to control for
time-series effects. According to the studies by Coles and Li (2016, 2018), unobserved CEO
characteristics also have significant effect on CEO pay-performance relationship. Thus, we
estimate equations with firm fixed effects to address this issue.
We have to acknowledge that current literature also uses delta to measure the CEO payperformance sensitivity (Coles et al., 2006; Babenko 2009; Dang et al., 2018). However, in our
sample of Chinese firms, there are only 127 firms granting stock options to CEOs. Due to the
small sample disproportionate our investigated population, we are unable to obtain meaningful
results using delta to measure the CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, the data we
obtained from the CSMAR database is limited, so that we are not able to calculate the value of
stock options using the Black-Scholes model indicated by the delta definition. In addition, it
has been argued that Chinese stock market is influenced by various factors including
government manipulation, which makes stock price too noisy to measure firm performance
(XXX). Therefore, we do not use the delta to measure the CEO pay-performance sensitivity in
this study.
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4. Empirical Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the sample. The average CEO pay is 480,899 RMB,
which is almost six times more than that from 1998 to 2000 (Firth et al., 2007). The average
ownership of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are 4.189% and 1.254%, respectively, and the
results are in line with Firth et al. (2016). The summary of Mutuald and QFIId shows that in
our sample, 62.7% of firms have domestic mutual funds as shareholders and 9.9% of firms have
QFIIs as shareholders. This indicates that institutional ownership is quite common in the
Chinese equity market. Based on average board size (9.057) and the number of independent
directors (3.274), the percentage of independent directors can be obtained, which is 36.15%.
The average percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders is 36.602%, which reflects a
high level of ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Moreover, the percentage of
observations for non-state-owned firms is 42.855%.
[Insert Table 1 here]
4.2 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship
Table 2 presents the results from testing our main hypotheses. Specifically, column (1)
shows the results of focusing on whether there are institutional investors as shareholders.
Column (2) shows the results of focusing on institutional investors’ ownership, while column
(3) shows the results of focusing on the difference between institutional investors’ ownership
and controlling shareholder’s ownership. We are concerned about the interactive terms because
they reflect the effects that institutional investors have on the CEO pay-performance
relationship. As shown in columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of Mutuald*ROA (0.686) and
Mutual*ROA (8.454) are both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which
indicates that the presence of domestic mutual funds helps to link CEO pay to firm performance,
and this effect becomes stronger when domestic mutual funds hold a larger percentage of shares.
This result is consistent with our H1a. We also find that the coefficients of QFIId*ROA and
QFII*ROA are positive but insignificant, which implies that QFIIs do not have significant
effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. This is consistent with our hypothesis H1b.
Column (3) shows that the coefficient of Mutualratio*ROA is 1.556 and significant at the
1% level (t-value is 3.38), while the coefficient of QFIIratio*ROA is insignificant. This
suggests that the previously documented strengthening effects of domestic mutual funds
become even stronger when their ownership is closer to the controlling shareholder’s
ownership. This finding is consistent with our H2. The results of the relationship between
control variables and CEO pay are consistent with previous studies (Firth et al., 2007).
11

Overall, the existence of domestic mutual funds can improve corporate governance by
strengthening the CEO pay-performance relationship. When the ownership of domestic mutual
funds is closer to the controlling shareholders and present as large shareholders, their influence
becomes stronger as a result of the strong incentive to contend with controlling shareholders.
However, due to the challenges/obstacles that are unique to China’s culture (such as
relationship-based economy and various languages spoken within the country), QFIIs cannot
improve corporate governance due to an inability to improve their monitoring performance.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4.3 Effects of institutional ownership between SOEs and non-SOEs
In this section, we test hypothesis H3 by dividing our sample firms into SOEs and nonSOEs. A firm is identified as an SOE if the ultimate controlling shareholder is the government.
Empirically, we re-estimate equation (1) using separate subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs,
and report the results in Table 3. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are the results of using a
subsample of SOEs, and columns (4) to (6) are the results of using a subsample of non-SOEs.
Again, we are concerned about the interactive terms. It is observed that the coefficient of
Mutuald*ROA is 0.533 for SOEs, which is significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.17), and
0.944 for non-SOEs, which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.60). The coefficient of
Mutual*ROA is 7.481 for SOEs, which is significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.40), and 11.926
for non-SOEs, which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.92). These results suggest that
domestic mutual funds can strengthen the CEO pay-performance relationship, and this is more
significant in non-SOEs as reflected by the larger magnitude of coefficients for non-SOEs.
The different effects that domestic mutual funds have in SOEs and non-SOEs are more
obvious when the difference in ownership between them and controlling shareholders is
considered. In particular, column (3) shows that the coefficient of Mutualratio*ROA is 1.405
in SOEs, which is significant at only 10% level (t-value is 1.81); while it is 2.292 for non-SOEs
in column (6), which is significant at 1% level (t-value is 4.32). This suggests that when the
ownership of domestic mutual funds is closer to that of controlling shareholders, the incentive
of domestic mutual funds to contend with controlling shareholders is stronger in non-SOEs.
This is reflected by the more significant and larger coefficient of Mutualratio*ROA for nonSOEs. The Chow tests (F=5.205, p-value<0.01; F=5.327, p-value<0.01; F=5.293, pvalue<0.01) reveal that the effects of domestic mutual funds are stronger on the CEO payperformance relationship in non-SOEs than SOEs.
To further test H3, we re-estimate equation (1) using subsamples of central government
controlled SOEs and local government controlled SOEs. The results are reported in Table 4. It
12

is observed that in columns (1) to (3), the coefficients of all the interactive terms between mutual
funds’ ownership measure and ROA are insignificant. This means that mutual funds have no
significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship in central government controlled
SOEs. However, the results in columns (4) to (6) reveal that the coefficients of interactive terms
between mutual funds’ ownership measure and ROA are significantly positive. This suggests
that mutual funds have significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship in local
government controlled SOEs. These results validate hypothesis H3. These results are also
consistent with Firth et al. (2010) who argue that domestic mutual funds face pressure and
regulation from local governments, so the effect of domestic mutual funds is mitigated and they
are less likely to contend with governments in SOEs.
[Insert Table 3 here]
[Insert Table 4 here]
4.4 Endogeneity issues, additional evidence and robustness tests
4.4.1 Endogeneity issues

Although we have used firm fixed effects to address the potential endogeneity issue, our
study faces a potential issue of sample selection bias as institutional investors may prefer
particular firms or industries. To address this issue, we use the Heckman two-stage method. The
first stage involves an OLS analysis where institutional ownership is regressed against the same
control variables from the main equation. To meet the exclusion restrictions, we also include
three variables that we do not include in the second-stage regression. The first two variables are
the industry median level of mutual funds and QFIIs. The third variable is a dummy variable
which captures the index inclusion of a firm, following Firth et al. (2016) and Rong et al. (2017).
In particular, this variable is Index which is equal to 1 if a firm is included in either the Shanghai
180 index or Shenzhen Component index in a year and 0 otherwise. We then obtain the inverse
Mills ratios (Lambda) from the first stage and include them as independent variables in the
second stage.
Furthermore, we use the PSM method to construct a sample in which the treatment sample
and control sample are similar in terms of some observed characteristics. In this matching
process, for each firm-year observation in the treatment sample (i.e., those observations with
either domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders), we identify an observation in the
control sample (i.e., those observations without either domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as
shareholders) with the same/nearest propensity score of firm characteristics including firm size,
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leverage, board size, board independence, the largest shareholder’s ownership, and CEO age in
the same year from the same industry.
The results of using the Heckman two-stage method and PSM are reported in Table 5,
which are quite similar to those reported in Table 2, indicating that our main results are robust
after considering the potential endogeneity issues using alternative estimation methods.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Moreover, it could be also argued that institutional investors prefer investing in firms with
a strong CEO pay-performance relationship, which results in reverse causality. To address this
issue, we examine changes in the CEO pay-performance relationship when institutional
investors sell their holding firms ownership. 4 The results show that the increase (decrease) of
mutual funds’ ownership strengthens (weakens) the pay-performance relationship. In order to
save space, we do not report the related results, but they are available on request.
4.4.2 Corporate governance channel
We have previously argued that mutual funds strengthen CEO pay-performance by
monitoring CEOs’ behaviors and improving corporate governance. In this section, we provide
empirical evidence to validate that corporate governance is the channel through which mutual
funds can affect CEO pay-performance. 5 To measure the level of corporate governance, we use
the industry tournament incentives, since it is argued that strong industry tournament provides
effective incentives for CEOs (Coles et al., 2018). In particular, we use the compensation gap
between CEO in a firm and the highest paid CEO among firms operating in the same industry
to measure industry tournament. We then divide sample firms into two groups based on the
median value of industry tournament, and re-estimate equation (1) using these two subsamples
and report the results in Table 6. As can be seen from the results, the coefficients of interaction
terms of mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance are more significant in firms with less
intensive product market competition and in firms with weaker industry tournament. These
results support our argument that mutual funds affect CEO pay-performance via improving
corporate governance.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Moreover, there may be some other potential channels through which mutual funds have
influence on CEO compensation. For instance, Li et al. (2019) document that mutual funds are
4
5

We thank the referee for this suggestion.
We thank the referee for this suggestion.
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likely to require a stronger relationship between CEO pay and firm CSR outcomes, and firm
CSR outcomes are determined by mutual fund’s CSR score. Their study indicates that mutual
funds’ self-attributes affect their incentives for monitoring and improving corporate
governance, which is a key channel for mutual funds to affect CEO pay-performance
relationship. However, due to the data unavailability, we are not able to test this potential
channel empirically at the moment, but we call for future studies on this important issue.
4.4.3 Effects of regional development
Whether or not the function of institutional investors can be guaranteed depends mainly on
the development of a legal system and investor protection. The laws and regulations in more
developed regions could be better enforced which would protect investors’ interests. Moreover,
information asymmetry is believed to be more severe in firms from less developed regions,
which makes it difficult for institutional investors to know what is happening through investee
firms and to monitor effectively. Thus, we propose that institutional investors have a greater
effect in firms located in more developed regions. To test this conjecture, we take advantage of
the regional variations in China’s economic development to examine the different influences of
institutional investors. We do this by dividing the full sample into two groups of firms located
in more and less developed regions. All the regions are divided into more developed and less
developed based on the Chinese marketization index (Fan et al., 2011) which measures the
marketization levels of 31 provinces. We define the provinces ranking the top 15 as being more
developed and all the others as less developed.
Empirically, we estimate equation (1) using subsamples of firms located in more and less
developed regions separately. The results are reported in Table 7. Consistent with the structure
in Table 6, columns (1) to (3) are the results of using a subsample of firms located in more
developed regions, and columns (4) to (6) are the results of using a subsample of firms located
in less developed regions. Again, we are concerned about the coefficients of interactive terms.
Note that the coefficients of Mutuald*ROA, Mutual*ROA and Mutualratio*ROA are positive
and statistically significant for firms from more developed regions, while they are insignificant
for firms from less developed regions. These findings suggest the effects of domestic mutual
funds on strengthening the CEO pay-performance relationship are stronger in firms from more
developed regions. Note also that all the coefficients of interactive terms related to QFIIs are
not significant in firms from either more or less developed region, which confirms our previous
findings that QFIIs have no significant effect. These results support our argument that the
function of institutional investors can only be ensured when their interests/rights are well
protected, when the legal system is developed, and when regulations are properly enforced.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
4.4.4 Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct a further analysis to check the robustness of our main results.
First, we consider two alternative measures of CEO compensation to check the robustness of
our main results by: (1) including CEO ownership values; and (2) using the average
compensation of the top three executives. Harford and Li (2007) argue that managerial
ownership and its relationship with the firm performance could be used as an indication of good
governance. In spirit of their study, we are thus interested in examining whether CEO pay,
including the value of their shareholding, is positively related to firm performance, which is
due to the monitoring by institutional investors. Following the method used by Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006), we calculate the value of CEO ownership as the number of common shares
held by CEOs at the end of the fiscal year, multiplying the closing prices of the common shares
at the end of the fiscal year. The results are reported in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Second, we consider an alternative measure of firm performance which is market-based.
This is mainly because institutional investors are expected to maximize the return of their
investment portfolios via appreciations in stock price so they might have incentives to link CEO
pay to market-based performance. To provide empirical evidence for this conjecture to be
tested, we employ annual stock returns (RET) and Tobin’s Q as the proxies for firm market
performance, and then re-estimate equation (1). The untabulated results indicate that both
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have no significant effects on linking CEO pay to firm market
performance. This suggests that in China, institutional investors are more concerned about the
accounting performance of investee firms than market performance. One possible explanation
could be that since the Chinese stock market is influenced by many factors such as government
manipulation, stock returns are too noisy to measure firm performance accurately. For example,
China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $1,211 billion in 2000 and $12,237 billion in 2017,
which means that it increased by 14.57% each year. Meanwhile, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
index was 1408 in 2000 and 3196 in 2017, representing an increase of 4.9% per year. Obviously,
market performance cannot reflect accounting performance. Therefore, the accounting
measures are most likely to reflect firm performance and applied by investors to assess firm
value.
Moreover, to further test the robustness between institutional ownership and CEO payperformance relationship, we re-estimate equation (1) by using one-year lagged institutional
ownership and control variables. The results further validate the causality issue between mutual
16

funds’ ownership and CEO pay-performance relationship. To save space, the results in this
section are not reported but are available on request.
5. Conclusion
Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2005 to 2015, this paper examines the effect
of institutional investors on the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. The
empirical results indicate that domestic mutual funds play an important monitoring role in
linking CEO pay to firm performance. Moreover, this monitoring effect is stronger when
mutual fund ownership is larger and closer to controlling shareholder’s ownership. However,
QFIIs do not have such an effect on the CEO pay-performance relationship. These results are
robust to alternative estimation methods in addressing endogeneity issues and using alternative
measures for our key variables.
Moreover, the effects of domestic mutual funds are more pronounced in non-SOEs and
local government controlled SOEs than in central government controlled SOEs. We also
provide strong evidence that mutual funds affect CEO pay-performance by improving corporate
governance. In particular, the positive effect of mutual funds is more significant in those firms
with weaker industry tournament. Meanwhile, the monitoring role of domestic mutual funds is
stronger in firms from more developed regions due to better investor protection and less
information asymmetry.
Overall, institutional investors reveal heterogeneous influences on monitoring firm
management in China, which advances our understanding of the importance to identify the
types of institutional investors when investigating their influence. Our results show that in
China with many dialects and a relationship-based economy, foreign investors face severe
information asymmetry problems and are less efficient in monitoring, suggesting that further
regulatory efforts are required to protect foreign investors’ rights and reinforce their function
in improving corporate governance in China. As a more important implication, our study
suggests that considering the influence of controlling shareholders can shed more light on
understanding the effect of involving institutional investors in corporate governance practices
in China.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable
Observations Mean
Std.Dev. Median Min
25%
75%
Max
Panel A: Executive characteristics
CEO pay
15,613
480,899 299,482 403,000 120,000 233,454 680,000 1,056,000
CEO age
15,613
47.825 5.205
48
40
43
52
56
Panel B: Institutional ownership
Mutual* (%)
9,501
4.189
4.468
2.52
0.02
0.88
6.06
33.416
QFII* (%)
1,548
1.254
1.263
0.88
0.01
0.44
1.63
12.468
Others* (%)
10,228
2.87
4.076
1.68
0.025
0.71
3.56
73.03
Mutualratio* (%)
9,501
14.389 20.028
7.183
0.035
2.443
18.187
330.198
QFIIratio* (%)
1,548
4.101
5.598
2.394
0.012
1.068
4.968
68.430
Mutuald
15,613
0.627
0.484
1
0
0
1
1
QFIId
15,613
0.099
0.299
0
0
0
0
1
Panel C: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Board Size
15,613
9.057
1.828
9
3
8
9
19
Independent
15,613
3.274
0.664
3
1
3
4
8
Leverage (%)
15,613
48.068 20.200
48.927
5.660
32.946 63.288
99.861
Firm Size (million) 15,613
4,890
4,840
2,810
720
1,360
6,560
15,700
Largest (%)
15,613
36.602 15.503
34.655
2.197
24.210 47.890
89.990
Q
15,613
1.750
0.834
1.454
0.893
1.060
2.251
3.393
Panel D: Firm performance
ROA (%)
15,613
3.626
5.681
3.300
-27.920 1.220
6.190
20.460
RET (%)
15,613
41.591 92.095
15.03
-86.930 -11.49
70.59
142.87
Panel E: Firm type distributions
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Observations
8,922(57.145%)
6,691(42.855%)
(percentage)
Descriptive statistics of observations from 2005 to 2015, excluding observations with leverage larger than 1. Panel
A reports summary statistics for executive characteristics. CEO pay is the cash compensation of CEO, which has
been available since 2005. Panel B reports summary statistics of firm institutional ownership. * represents the
summary result of firms with positive institutional ownership. Specifically, Mutual* represents firms which have
mutual funds as shareholders. QFII* represents firms which have QFIIs as shareholders. Others* represents firms
which have other types of institutional investors as shareholders. Panel C reports summary statistics for firm
characteristics and corporate governance. Panel D reports summary statistics for firm performance. Panel E reports
firm distribution. All the definitions of the variables are listed in Appendix A and the value of variables are in
terms of China’s currency, the RMB.
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Table 2. Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
(1)
(2)
Mutuald
0.012
(1.06)
QFIId
-0.007
(-0.36)
Mutuald*ROA
0.686***
(3.87)
QFIId*ROA
0.025
(0.10)
Mutual
0.310
(1.63)
QFII
-0.303
(-0.24)
Mutual*ROA
8.454***
(3.75)
QFII*ROA
7.777
(0.42)
Mutualratio

(3)

0.061
(1.37)
QFIIratio
-0.012
(-0.05)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.556***
(3.38)
QFIIratio*ROA
0.024
(0.01)
ROA
0.857***
0.970***
1.047***
(6.10)
(7.83)
(8.63)
Others
0.110
0.149
0.139
(0.69)
(0.92)
(0.86)
Size
0.177***
0.186***
0.184***
(9.60)
(10.17)
(10.08)
Leverage
-0.139**
-0.149***
-0.148***
(-2.57)
(-2.78)
(-2.75)
Board
0.139**
0.141**
0.137**
(2.48)
(2.52)
(2.45)
Independent
0.074
0.080
0.074
(0.52)
(0.57)
(0.52)
Largest
-0.069
-0.062
-0.037
(-0.71)
(-0.64)
(-0.38)
CEOage
0.007***
0.007***
0.007***
(4.16)
(4.21)
(4.19)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.344
0.346
0.345
This table reports the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship using the firm
fixed-effect model. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Mutuald (QFIId) is the dummy
variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a firm and 0 otherwise. Mutual
and QFII denote ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Mutualratio and QFIIratio are the ratios
of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership, respectively. Others
represents the sum of ownership of other types of institutional investors. Size is the natural log of firms’ total
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Board is the natural log of firms’ numbers of directors on
the board. Independent is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Largest is the largest shareholders’
ownership. CEOage is the age of CEO. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed
using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 3. Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship in SOEs and nonSOEs
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
SOE subsample
Non-SOE subsample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.032**
-0.021
(2.24)
(-1.13)
QFIId
0.003
-0.030
(0.12)
(-0.76)
Mutuald*ROA
0.533**
0.944***
(2.17)
(3.60)
QFIId*ROA
0.028
0.053
(0.08)
(0.11)
Mutual
0.641***
-0.350
(2.69)
(-1.21)
QFII
0.301
-1.558
(0.22)
(-0.62)
Mutual*ROA
7.481**
11.926***
(2.40)
(3.92)
QFII*ROA
4.434
17.361
(0.20)
(0.56)
Mutualratio
0.139**
-0.067
(2.08)
(-1.15)
QFIIratio
-0.027
-0.044
(-0.09)
(-0.09)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.405*
2.292***
(1.81)
(4.32)
QFIIratio*ROA
1.656
0.107
(0.30)
(0.02)
ROA
1.194***
1.257***
1.335***
0.320
0.463**
0.545***
(6.61)
(7.93)
(8.52)
(1.46)
(2.38)
(2.85)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
7,588
7,588
7,588
5,440
5,440
5,440
R-squared
0.356
0.359
0.357
0.332
0.333
0.333
(1) vs (4)
(2) vs (5)
(3) vs (6)
Chow test
5.205***
5.327***
5.293***
This table shows different effects of institutional investors in SOEs and non-SOEs using firm fixed-effect model.
Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Columns (1) to (3) are results of using SOEs as the
sample and columns (4) to (6) are results of using non-SOEs as the sample. Mutuald (QFIId) is the dummy
variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a firm and 0 otherwise. Mutual
and QFII denotes ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Mutualratio and QFIIratio are the
ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership, respectively.
Control variables in equation (1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the variables are the same as
those in previous tables. Year dummies are included. The Chow tests’ F statistics reveal the significance of the
difference in the coefficients on Mutuald*ROA, Mutual*ROA and Mutualratio*ROA for SOEs and non-SOEs. The
t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship in central government
controlled SOEs and local government controlled SOEs
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Central government controlled SOEs
Local government controlled SOEs
subsample
subsample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.056**
0.022
(2.03)
(1.34)
QFIId
-0.038
0.024
(-0.80)
(0.87)
Mutuald*ROA
-0.123
0.785***
(-0.29)
(2.69)
QFIId*ROA
0.233
-0.112
(0.39)
(-0.27)
Mutual
0.577
0.679**
(1.33)
(2.37)
QFII
-3.107
1.590
(-1.07)
(1.04)
Mutual*ROA
4.944
8.396**
(0.78)
(2.30)
QFII*ROA
38.960
-7.371
(0.85)
(-0.29)
Mutualratio
0.200*
0.125
(1.80)
(1.60)
QFIIratio
-1.077*
0.351
(-1.73)
(1.08)
Mutualratio*ROA
0.078
1.821**
(0.05)
(2.07)
QFIIratio*ROA
12.025
-1.923
(0.86)
(-0.31)
ROA
1.406***
1.198***
1.316***
1.130***
1.250***
1.323***
(3.93)
(3.68)
(4.13)
(5.53)
(6.89)
(7.35)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
2,122
2,122
2,122
5,466
5,466
5,466
R-squared
0.303
0.308
0.306
0.327
0.330
0.329
This table shows different effects of institutional investors in central government controlled SOEs and local
government controlled SOEs using firm fixed-effect model. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO
compensation. Columns (1) to (3) are results of using central government controlled SOEs as the sample and
columns (4) to (6) are results of using local government controlled SOEs as the sample. Mutuald (QFIId) is the
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a firm and 0 otherwise.
Mutual and QFII denotes ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Mutualratio and QFIIratio are
the ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership,
respectively. Control variables in equation (1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the variables are
the same as those in previous tables. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed
using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance (Heckman and PSM)
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Heckman two-stage (second stage)
PSM matching method
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
-0.023
0.010
(-1.18)
(0.78)
QFIId
0.010
-0.006
(0.40)
(-0.28)
Mutuald*ROA
0.705***
0.548***
(3.96)
(2.72)
QFIId*ROA
0.043
-0.038
(0.16)
(-0.14)
Mutual
0.168
0.354*
(0.82)
(1.77)
QFII
1.245
-0.161
(0.81)
(-0.13)
Mutual*ROA
8.918***
7.400***
(3.96)
(3.18)
QFII*ROA
7.352
4.463
(0.40)
(0.24)
Mutualratio
0.021
0.067
(0.45)
(1.42)
QFIIratio
0.171
0.027
(0.58)
(0.10)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.686***
1.333***
(3.72)
(2.84)
QFIIratio*ROA
0.270
-1.048
(0.06)
(-0.25)
ROA
0.839*** 0.954***
1.024***
1.125***
1.215***
1.312***
(5.97)
(7.67)
(8.42)
(6.14)
(8.12)
(9.08)
LambdaMutual
-1.818**
-0.900*
-1.242**
(-2.04)
(-1.78)
(-2.54)
LambdaQFII
2.625
3.958*
2.411
(1.12)
(1.76)
(1.15)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
11,206
11,206
11,206
R-squared
0.298
0.302
0.301
0.331
0.334
0.332
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship using Heckman
two-stage method and PSM. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are results of using Heckman two-stage method
(second stage), and columns (4) to (6) are results of using PSM. Control variables in equation (1) are included in
each regression. LambdaMutual and LambdaQFII are inverse mills ratios obtained from the first stage of Heckman
two-stage model. Definitions of all the variables are the same as those in previous tables. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Effects of institutional investors in firms with larger and smaller industry tournament
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Firms with larger industry tournament
Firms with smaller industry tournament
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.001
0.010
(0.07)
(1.05)
QFIId
-0.016
0.007
(-0.73)
(0.48)
Mutuald*ROA
0.343
0.410**
(1.80)
(2.59)
QFIId*ROA
-0.087
0.064
(-0.34)
(0.31)
Mutual
0.025
0.345**
(0.12)
(2.03)
QFII
-0.278
0.484
(-0.15)
(0.57)
Mutual*ROA
3.292
4.486**
(1.34)
(2.16)
QFII*ROA
2.488
1.026
(0.08)
(0.08)
Mutualratio
-0.001
0.063
(-0.01)
(1.48)
QFIIratio
-0.381
0.054
(-0.82)
(0.29)
Mutualratio*ROA
0.782
0.771*
(1.37)
(1.86)
QFIIratio*ROA
1.488
-0.108
(0.23)
(-0.03)
ROA
0.026
0.082
0.088
0.813***
0.912***
0.970***
(0.23)
(0.80)
(0.87)
(5.73)
(7.70)
(8.46)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
3,543
3,543
3,543
9,485
9,485
9,485
R-squared
0.039
0.040
0.040
0.204
0.209
0.207
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on pay-performance relationship in firms with larger or
smaller industry tournament using firm fixed-effect model. Columns (1) to (3) are results of testing firms with
larger industry tournament. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing firms with smaller industry tournament.
Control variables in equation (1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the variables are the same as
those in previous tables. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 7. Effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship across regions
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay
Firms from more developed regions
Firms from less developed regions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.013
0.021
(0.93)
(0.98)
QFIId
0.001
-0.002
(0.05)
(-0.04)
Mutuald*ROA
0.725***
0.626
(3.50)
(1.59)
QFIId*ROA
-0.088
0.235
(-0.27)
(0.42)
Mutual
0.329
0.165
(1.37)
(0.46)
QFII
0.011
-0.951
(0.01)
(-0.46)
Mutual*ROA
9.314***
5.033
(3.46)
(1.08)
QFII*ROA
2.594
23.197
(0.11)
(0.61)
Mutualratio
0.068
0.032
(1.17)
(0.40)
QFIIratio
0.141
-0.717
(0.48)
(-1.13)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.701***
0.588
(2.99)
(0.60)
QFIIratio*ROA
-0.951
-1.920
(-0.19)
(-0.20)
ROA
0.782***
0.907***
0.987***
1.000***
1.161***
1.267***
(4.61)
(5.90)
(6.57)
(3.73)
(4.87)
(5.37)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
9,062
9,062
9,062
2,697
2,697
2,697
R-squared
0.327
0.329
0.328
0.397
0.396
0.395
This table shows the effects of institutional investors across regions using firm fixed-effect model. Columns (1) to
(3) are results using firms from more developed regions as the sample and columns (4) to (6) are results using
firms from less developed regions as the sample. The slightly lower number of observations is due to missing
information about some firms’ locations. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Mutuald
(QFIId) is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a firm and
0 otherwise. Mutual and QFII denotes ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Mutualratio and
QFIIratio are the ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s
ownership, respectively. Control variables in equation (1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the
variable are the same as those in previous tables. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are
computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8. Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship using alternative
definition of CEO pay
Dependent variable
The natural log of (CEO pay + value
The natural log of average compensation of
of CEO’s shareholding)
the top three executives
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Mutuald
0.004
0.028**
(0.16)
(2.34)
QFIId
0.013
0.003
(0.41)
(0.14)
Mutuald*ROA
1.129***
0.398**
(3.52)
(2.10)
QFIId*ROA
-0.648
-0.099
(-1.40)
(-0.37)
Mutual
0.789**
0.478**
(2.16)
(2.18)
QFII
-0.163
0.849
(-0.07)
(0.72)
Mutual*ROA
8.978**
5.813**
(2.05)
(2.06)
QFII*ROA
-36.944
4.896
(-1.11)
(0.29)
Mutualratio
0.175**
0.068
(2.09)
(1.26)
QFIIratio
-0.007
0.130
(-0.01)
(0.48)
Mutualratio*ROA
1.635*
1.206**
(1.66)
(2.10)
QFIIratio*ROA
-10.319
1.814
(-1.35)
(0.40)
ROA
1.035*** 1.306***
1.379***
1.038***
1.064***
1.114***
(4.82)
(6.58)
(7.12)
(6.93)
(8.18)
(8.73)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
13,028
R-squared
0.174
0.176
0.175
0.508
0.510
0.509
This table shows the results using different measurement of CEO payment. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) use the
natural log of (CEO pay + value of CEO’s shareholding) as the measurement of CEO compensation. Columns (4)
to (6) use the natural log of average payment of the top three executives as the measurement of CEO payment.
Control variables in equation (1) are included in each regression. Control variables in equation (1) are included in
each regression. Definitions of all the variables are the same as those in previous tables. Year dummies are
included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *,
** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix A. Variables Definition
Variables
Panel A: Executive compensation and age
CEO pay
CEO age
Panel B: Institutional ownership
Mutual
QFII
Others

Definition
The natural log of CEO compensation
The age of CEO

The ownership percentage of domestic mutual funds in a firm.
The ownership percentage of QFIIs in a firm
The sum of ownership of other types of institutional investors
(including banks, insurance companies, social security funds,
brokers, entrust companies, and financial companies) in a firm.
Mutuald
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has domestic
mutual funds as shareholders and 0 otherwise
QFIId
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has QFII as
shareholders and 0 otherwise
Mutualcont
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if domestic mutual funds
are the controlling shareholder of a firm and 0 otherwise.
Mutualratio
Ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the largest
shareholder’s ownership
QFIIratio
Ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s
ownership
Mutualdec
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ownership of mutual
funds decreases and 0 otherwise
QFIIdec
A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the ownership of QFIIs
decreases and 0 otherwise
ΔMutual
The change of mutual funds’ ownership, which is calculated by
mutual funds’ ownership in a given year minus one-year lagged
mutual funds’ ownership
ΔQFII
The change of QFIIs’ ownership, which is calculated by QFIIs’
ownership in a given year minus one-year lagged QFIIs’
ownership
Panel C: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Board size (Board)
The natural log of the number of directors on the board
Independent directors (Independent)
Proportion of independent directors on the board
Leverage
Total debts/total assets in book value
Firm size (size)
The natural log of total assets
Largest shareholder (Largest)
Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder
Tobin’s Q
Market value/replacement value
Panel D: Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA)
Net income/total assets
Stock Return (RET)
Firm annual stock return
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